Progress and Pluralism in Philosophy

Autor/innen

  • Trenton Merricks

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5282/mthz/5371

Abstract

The methods of Philosophy deliver a certain sort of philosophical understanding. But those methods are not able – not all on their own – to reveal the truth-value of substantive philosophical claims. This inability plays a key role in this paper’s argument for the conclusion that Philosophy has made a lot of progress despite persisting disagreement among philosophers about substantive philosophical claims. Moreover – so this paper maintains – this disagreement constitutes a welcome intellectual pluralism, allowing those with a wide variety of philosophical views to fully participate in the discipline of Philosophy. This paper then applies the above points to the relation of metaphysics to theology.

Downloads

Veröffentlicht

18.12.2023

Ausgabe

Rubrik

Abhandlungen